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I
n international economics, arms trade is a rather neglected subject. In a situation of potential or actual conflict no-one is interested in unveiling information on defense capabilities to potential or actual enemies. Secrecy, as an important ingredient in military strategy, protects the international arms market very effectively from investigation. Of all social science data it is probably that of the military sector which is the most scarce and unreliable. Many economists have found themselves frustrated in their search for "real" facts by the paucity and inaccuracy of data on arms trade.
Since the Second World War, however, considerable advances have been made and military economics has begun to emerge partly from its obscurity. Statistics on military expenditure and international arms trade have become more widely available. Today the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (IISS) offer a large quantity of military data. With these data sources a few statements on international arms trade are possible. ~ If we first examine recent trends in international arms trade flows, we can see the following from Table 1:2 [] At the beginning of the 1980's the United States was the leading arms supplier, with a share of almost 40 % of total arms exports.
[] The Soviet Union followed in the rank order of suppliers with a share of 32 %.
* Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of California. A longer version of this paper will be published in: Leisinger, Tuchtfeld, S t r a u b h a a r : Studien zur EntwicklungsqSkonomie, SozioSkonomische Forschungen, Bern and Stuttgart 1986, forthcoming.
[] The two superpowers taken together accounted for more than 70 % of global arms trade.
[] France as the third largest arms supplier accounted for 10 %, while the share of the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy together made another 10 %.
[] The United States has been in the lead in total arms exports since 1981 and its share has increased from 26 % (1979)to 40 % (1984)as a result of the expansive arms export policy pursued by the Reagan Administration.
[] On the other hand, the share of the Soviet Union has declined from 46 % (1979) to 22 % (1984 (SIPRI 1985, 200) , where the first figure indicates the year and the second figure indicates the page. Following the SIPRI statistics by speaking of data on "international arms trade" we mean the international arms trade in four categories of "major weapons": aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles and warships. Not included is therefore the international arms trade in small arms, in equipment that may be needed for operating, maintaining and repairing a weapons system (e.g. all kinds of munitions, communication systems, radar and warning systems, repair and maintenance parts and facilities). For a detailed treatment of all questions related to sources and methods used in the SIPRI data of international arms trade cf. SIPRI: The Arms Trade with the Third World, Stockholm, New York 1971, pp. 785-820 . In the following we use the terms "weapons", "arms" and "military equipment" as synonyms.
2 Cf. also SIPR11985, 346-351. 3 "One possible reason for this is the Soviet reluctance to part with advanced production technology, which is now often required by the recipients. Another explanation is the poor performance of Soviet weapons in the 1982 Lebanon War. Some of the Soviet Union's main clients also seem to have acquired more weapons than they have been able to absorb (e.g. Libya and South Yemen)." (SIPR11985, 347). 
Arms Imports
On the demand side of the international arms trade the importance of the Third World is completely inverse to its position on the supply side (Table 1, [] This decline in arms imports for the last few years is most pronounced in Africa and the Far East (end of the Vietnam war) while the import of major weapons in Latin America has become more and more important (Central American crisis).
5 "This downward trend has been largely determined by economic factors. Many countries.., in the Third World, are burdened by debts and can no longer allocate so much funding to armaments. The decline can also in part be explained by market saturation -cycles of weapon acquisition were terminated in the early 1980s in many countries, and they are now pausing to catch their breath. Countries are also increasingly substituting domestic arms production for arms import." (SIPR11985, 345), When we ask which countries are the highest ranking Third World arms-importing countries, Table 3 shows that Egypt, Syria and Iraq are the leaders with a share of 10 % each. With the exception of India, the seven highest ranking countries are located in the Middle East. Together their shares account for about 50 % of all Third World arms imports. Seven of the 20 largest Third World arms-importing countries belong to the group of the lowincome economies, with an average income per capita of less than 800 US-Dollars in 1983 (India, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Indonesia, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria). 6
Consequences for the Third World
Every good and every service a country imports, absorbs foreign currency. The quantity of foreign exchange which a country has at its disposal is restricted by the inflows of foreign exchange, whether through exports of goods and services or through loans raised in the international capital market. Therefore the direct consequences 7 of the arms imports for a country are twofold:
6 Cf. World Bank: World Development Report 1985 , Washington 1985 In the following we will mention only those consequences of arms imports which are either typical for the Third World compared to the industrialized countries or which are typical for arms imports compared to the import of other goods and services. Effects which are the same for the Third World and for the industrialized countries or general effects of international trade are noglocted. We also neglect the fact that (mostly for political reasons) some arms imports have been offered with bargainbasement prices, giveaway prices, non-interest financing with long grace and repayment periods (up to forty years) and with a willingness to accept barter transactions. [] Secondly, if the country borrows the foreign exchange to pay for the arms imports, it will be burdened by repayment and interest liabilities.
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In the case of Third World countries these consequences are especially significant. For most of them the scarcity of foreign exchange represents one of the strongest development restraints: it restricts the import of goods and services necessary to increase productivity in the agricultural sector and/or in the industrial sector. The absorption of foreign exchange through the import of military equipment places an additional restriction on the import of such investment goods.
To give an idea of the magnitude with which the import of arms has crowded out the import of other goods and services, we estimated how many civil goods and services might have been additionally imported if no military equipment had been purchased abroad. Column (5) of Table 3 gives the answers to this question for the 20 largest Third World weapon-importing countries in the period 1980-84.
[] For Syria, Jordan, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Cuba the arms imports have reached a level of at least one third of the imports of civil goods and services, and for Egypt this ratio was one fifth.
[] For all the other highest ranking Third World armsimporting countries, these imports have crowded out the import of other goods and services by less than 10 %, a figure which confirms a former estimation that the annual average importation of major weapons in recent years represents 3-4 % of total Third World imports of all kinds. 8
If the foreign exchange to pay for the arms imports is borrowed from the international capital market, the consequences for the Third World countries will be negative because the import of military equipment does not normally lead to stimulated outputs which would generate sufficient additional income to repay the loans. Therefore, besides the interest payments for the initial loan, new costs will arise from the debt conversion.
In an attempt to estimate the contribution of arms imports to the burning problem of the debt burden in the [] Once imported, the military equipment has to be operated and maintained. Because of the highly sophisticated technology of most of the imported arms, this work has to be done by specialists, who are scarce in Third World countries. This skilled manpower either has to be taken away from other tasks within the country or it has to be imported from abroad. In the former case it is hard to replace and the average domestic product is likely to fall. In the latter case the importing of foreign specialists generates further foreign exchange outflows.
[] The import of "major weapons" only represents the "hardware" of the military equipment. But a particular "major weapon" can rarely be used in isolation. It is generally part of a system comprising a lot of additional "software." To get the desired effect from an aircraft, an armoured vehicle, a missile or a warship requires the support of "minor weapons" and also the existence of a certain infrastructure to assure firepower, mobility, communication and logistic.
[] In mostoftheThirdWorld countries existing technical capacity does not allow many of those complementary products (not even the less complex ones) to be produced. Therefore these running costs require additional imports and a large spill-over effect from them g SIPR11985, 448.
to industrial branches in the Third World is rather unlikely.
[] The same pessimistic expectation might be justified for the domestic production of military-related services. The hope that the foreign specialists spend a lot on transportation, travel, leisure, communication and other services is not assured. Often the quality of the domestically produced services is far below the level required by the foreign technicians.
[] And even if the arms imports led to large spill-over effects, we would still have to compare these with the effects which an alternative use of the arms importrelated resources would have generated.
[] It is at least doubtful that the operating, maintaining and repairing of imported military equipment provides the Third World with skills and manpower training. Besides the possibility that foreign specialists are hired for that work, there is the question as to what extent the skills learnt by operating and maintaining weapons can be transferred easily into the civil sector. And even if this transfer is easy we still have to compare the costs of these additional skills and training with the effects of a possible alternative use of the military-bound resources.
Finally we have to mention some possible dynamic effects of arms imports: "The importation of armaments by one nation can easily lead to a local arms race as each country in the region attempts to gain a strategic superiority... Each nation in the race will constantly increase its import requirements at increasing cost. Furthermore, in order to achieve this superiority, the weapons imported will have to be as advanced as possible, and this will lead to ever-increasing costs of operation and maintenance. ''1~ The experiences in the Middle East, in Central America and in Southern Africa -to name only a few of many examples -have shown clearly enough how extremely hard it is to stop an arms race once it has begun. There is always the potential danger that, by importing arms, a Third World country might commit itself to constant arms imports to maintain parity with its rivals. 
